Applications of Games Theory in Analyzing Teaching Process  by Ghic, Graţiela & Grigorescu, Carmen Judith
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  116 ( 2014 )  3588 – 3592 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Education and Research Center.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.01.807 
ScienceDirect
5th World Conference on Educational Sciences - WCES 2013 
Applications of games theory in analyzing teaching process 
Graţiela Ghica*, Carmen Judith Grigorescub  
aDimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Faculty of International Business and Economics, Bucharest,Romania 
bDimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy, Bucharest,Romania 
Abstract 
In the teaching activity, the problem of choosing the best solutions, methods and teaching procedures is usually difficult due to 
the complexity of pedagogical situations and random nature of individual particularities. This study aims at giving an answer to 
the question: can we plan the system of educational actions so that each action gives us maximum efficiency, reducing any 
unwanted results (routine, boredom ...). For this purpose we use games theory techniques. Games theory provides models of 
situations in which each chosen action can give us in different cases, different results with a known probability. The objective is 
to find the optimal mixed strategy for the professor to ensure the best possible result, giving any mixed response strategies of the 
students. The analysis is performed at the level of some disciplines highly mathematized: applied mathematics in economics, 
financial and economic analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The mathematical models in the actual practice of the didactical process are not possible without a psychological 
and pedagogical basic research regarding the corresponding individual facts and phenomena. The characteristic of 
the pedagogical phenomena raises a lot of problems related to the quantitative research. Hence, the fact that many 
immaterial training factors cannot be quantitatively determined entails the necessity to use statistic correlations. The 
results of a teaching method application, of a means or device on different students will be always different. The 
exercises results depend on the productivity of the students’ memory, that is, in case of doing the same exercise, the 
students with a good memory will acquire the knowledge better than those with a poorer memory. Further to the 
statistics analysis there was noticed that the knowledge acquiring, having been repeated for several times, depends 
25% on the memory quality and 56% on the number of exercises. The conclusion is that the same type of exercises 
must be repeated more times until the students with poor memory catch up with the others. However, a hitch may 
occur:  for a certain category of students, the unvarying repetitions decrease the interest in learning and have 
negative consequences over its results. 
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2. Didactical process planning using the games theory  
One of the basic conditions for a good memory is repetition. The Latin saying repetitio mater studiorum est 
means that repetition must not be used at random if productivity is going to be enhanced. In order to get the 
expected result the most favourable number of repetitions must be taken into account. While too many repetitions 
lead to an over-learning phenomenon, too few of them may lead to under-learning. The excessive repetitions entail 
saturation and protection inhibition. According to the game theory, a conflict comes up.  Due to a certain factor the 
accumulation of repetitions improves the general learning results and due to another factor this accumulation 
worsens them.  In this conflicting situation, a professor must find the proper strategy to ensure the best medium 
result of all the possible ones. The situation may be considered as a game pattern, where the parties are the professor 
and the students.  
The conflict arises between the professor’s method to store the knowledge and the students’ characteristics which 
prevent the achievement of the expected pedagogical results through this method. Hence, the professor may use only 
one type of exercises to fix the specific knowledge. We call it the pure strategy no. 1. On the other hand, the 
professor may use only different types of exercises to fix the knowledge and this is the pure strategy no. 2. In case a 
professor uses each of these possible methods, a student’s results depend on the category that student belongs to. For 
example, the correlative analysis has proven  that  in order to fully assimilate the primal simplex Algorithm ( of 
medium difficulty degree)  there are necessary 8 problems on average, regardless the level of the students’ memory. 
What will happen when the professor chooses the pure strategy no.1 and he is going to fix the knowledge using 8 
exercises of the same type?  
The statistical analysis made on 50 students proved that the first category of students, those inclined to memorize 
through uniform repetition, will acquire 100% of knowledge whereas the second category, students who cannot 
stand monotony, will acquire 80% of the algorithm. The following matrix of payments is obtained:   
Table 1. Matrix of payments for strategy 1 
 
 Students  
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Professor–strategy 1 100 80 
 
If the professor chooses the pure strategy no.1, 8 exercise of different types, he will record losses for the first 
category of students. In case of frequent changes of the exercise or of its conduct, the students are confused and 
cannot adjust to the new situation. The following results are achieved: 
 
Table 2. Matrix of payments for strategy 2 
 
 Students  
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Professor–strategy 2 60 100 
 
Gathering the results in a single matrix of payments we get the results below: 
 
Table 3. Matrix of payments for gatering the results 
 
 Students 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
 
Professor 
strategy 1 100 80 
strategy 2 60 100 
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The above matrix describes the conflicting situation the professor is in, due to the differences among the 
students’ individual characteristics.  
It is obvious that the results of the professor’s choice are influenced by the different number of the students in the 
first category and the ones in the second. Hence, in the examined group there are 15 students of the first category 
and 5 of the second. The results of strategy no.1 are provided by:  
19
100
805
100
10015 =⋅+⋅  
of 20 students with good results, 
 
whereas the results of strategy no.2 are: of 20 students with good results. 
 
In the above situation, strategy no.1 is better. However, if there are 5 students of the first category and 15 of the 
second in the class, the following results will be achieved: 
17
100
8015
100
1005 =⋅+⋅  
of 20 students with good results for strategy no.1 and  
 
18
100
10015
100
605 =⋅+⋅  
 
of 20 students with good results for strategy no.2.  
This time the strategy no.2 is better. Therefore, in case of different proportions of the students in the first and 
second category there should be better applied different methods.  
3. Case study ( Economic Mathematics and Enterprise Economic Analysis, first and third year)  
In the Faculty of International Business of our University, 5 groups of students in the first year, section A, have 
been examined for the Economic Mathematics. The students have been divided in two categories: high-school 
graduates form Arts or Sciences (this fact overlapping the above described situations). 
Table 4. the results of the professor’s choice are influenced by the different number of the students in the first category and the ones in the second 
 
 Number of high-school graduates Strategy 
Arts  Sciences S1 S2 
Group 1 15 5 19/20 14/20 
Group 2 5 15 17/20 18/20
Group 3 10 10 18/20 16/20
Group 4 8 12 17,6/20 16,8/20
Group 5 12 8 18,4/20 15,2/20
 
14
100
1005
100
6015 =⋅+⋅
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This situation entails the following question: could it be found a combination of the methods 1 and 2 to provide 
the professor with fairly good results in any kind of classes, that is in case of any difference between the first and 
second types of students? If we formulate the problem once again the task will be: to find the professor’s optimum 
mixed strategy to ensure the best possible result, for any mixed strategy of the students’ answers.  
The analysed situation has two strategies: 
a.each party has 2 strategies  
b.the loss suffered by one of the parties must be equivalent to the other’s gain, meaning that the sum of the losses 
and gains is 0 (games with nul sum of 2x2 type). 
According to the games theory, the following rules are good for finding the best mixed strategy: 
1.the numbers in the first column of the matrix are substracted from the numbers in the second column  
2. there is written the reverse ratio of the absolute values of the resulted differences. 
 
 
This ratio determines the ratio regarding the application frequency for methods 1 and 2 in the case of optimum 
mixed strategy.   
  2080100 =−  
                                                                             4010060 =−  
                                                                                                  40:20 = 4:2 
This is the very ratio where we should apply strategies 1 and 2 in order to get the best result, regardless the 
structure of the classes from the considered point of view. Actually, there should be two types of exercise going to 
be repeated 4 times.  
In this case, the professor’s result  for the first category of students is:  
6,86
24
6021004
=
+
⋅+⋅ % 
For the second category of students:  
6,86
24
1002804
=
+
⋅+⋅ % 
Regardless the students’ pure strategy, in our case, the obtained results will certainly be of 86,6%. 
In group 4, there are 40% of the first category and 60% of the second and the students’ strategy is 4:6. This 
situation provides a new matrix of payments for the professor’s pure strategies (we get it by multiplying the 
respective columns by 0,4 and 0,6). 
 
Table 5. The new matrix of payments for the professor’s pure strategies 
 
 Students  
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
 
Professor   
strategy 1 40 48 
strategy 2 24 60 
 
Applying the professor’s same mixed strategy 4:2, for the students in the first category we gave the following 
result:  
6,34
24
24240400
=
+
⋅+⋅ % 
For the students in the second category:  
52
24
602484
=
+
⋅+⋅ % 
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In the above case, we amount 86,6% good results. The S1 pure strategy provided 17,6/20 =88% good results and 
the S2 pure strategy provided 16,8/20=84% good results.  
The professor’s gain of 86,6% while checking the students’ pure strategies does not eliminate the possibility to 
get a better result in other more favorable situations. It is certain that in any combination of the students of the first 
and second category, be it the worst possible combination, the training results will not be lower than 86,6%, in case 
the professor resorts to the best strategy. 
At the section level there are the following results: 
 
Table 6. The professor’s gain while checking different strategies 
 
 Strategy 
S1 S2 S mixtă 
Goup 1 88% 84% 86,66% 
Group 2 85% 90% 86,66% 
Group 3 90% 80% 86,66% 
Group 4 88% 84% 86,66% 
Group 5 92% 76% 86,66% 
 
For the third year, in the Enterprise Economic Analysis, the topics – the approach of the breakeven point  
(mathematically as difficult as the primal simplex algorithm) the same mixed strategy has been applied. The 
determined matrix of payments is:  
Table 7. Matrix of payments (for the Enterprise Economic Analysis)   
 
 Students  
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
 
Professor 
strategy 1 100 70 
strategy 2 40 100 
 
Regarding the third year, we’d better not connect the students to the type of the high-school they graduated. We 
consider there have been essential changes in their ability to work with figures, their memory having been greatly 
developed. Therefore the professor should choose the best mixed strategy just as he cannot precisely determine the 
difference between the students in the first category and those in the second.  
4.   Conclusions 
The didactical activity planning is highly demanding. In the teaching process, the issue of choosing the best 
solutions or pedagogical methods is usually difficult especially due to the many-sided pedagogical situations and to 
the aleatory character of their particularities. For choosing solutions risky conditions, the planning model is provided 
by the games theory. 
In this study, simplifying the real situation to a great extent, we discovered that the best mixed strategies provide 
reasonable solutions for the professor so that he could efficiently plan the didactical process even before being 
aware of the group’s knowledge level.    
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